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RULES WITHOUT... : SOME CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS ON THE FEDERAL
CORPORATE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
JEFFREY S. PARKER*
INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 1991, following an extended gestation period marred
by controversy,' the United States Sentencing Commission's2 corporate
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law and former Deputy
Chief Counsel at the United States Sentencing Commission. This Article draws upon the author's
ongoing research projects on corporate criminal liability and the economics of criminal law, which
are being supported by the Cato Institute and the Sarah Scaife and John M. Olin Foundations. Ann
C. Hodges provided research assistance and Mark A. Cohen and Bruce H. Kobayashi provided
helpful guidance and comments.
1. See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Current Corporate Sentencing Proposals: History and Critique, 3
FED. SENTENCING REP. 133 (1990) (summarizing the history of the Sentencing Guidelines through
late 1990). The final Guidelines are very similar to the Sentencing Commission's proposal discussed
in that article.
Although the Commission's consideration of corporate sentencing dates back to the beginnings of
the Commission's operations in 1985, the subject was shelved until after the Commission promul-
gated its initial guidelines for individuals in 1987. See United States Sentencing Commission, Notice
of Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046 (1987) [hereinafter Initial
Guidelines] (incorporating technical, clarifying, and conforming amendments submitted to Congress
on May 1, 1987); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS (1987) [hereinafter INITIAL SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT] (explaining the basis for the Guidelines). In each of the next three years, the
Commission published draft proposals for corporate sentencing guidelines that reflected the continu-
ing controversy both within the Commission and between the Commission and the United States
Department of Justice. Eventually these conflicts were resolved into the approach reflected in the
Guidelines promulgated in 1991. In the meantime, the controversy had sparked Congress' interest.
The Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held oversight hearings dur-
ing 1990 which focused upon the delays in the development of the corporate Guidelines and on
charges of undue influence over the process by the White House. See generally Oversight on the
United States Sentencing Commission and Guidelines for Organizational Sanctions: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 House Hearings].
2. The Commission is an exotic species of federal government agency: "an independent com-
mission in the judicial branch," 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988), created by Congress in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976, 1987-2040
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673, 3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998), to implement the new sentencing
guideline system mandated by that Act. See generally Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy
for Organizations The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 513, 533-44
Washington University Open Scholarship
398 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 71:397
sentencing guidelines3 finally became effective.4 As of January 1993,
when this Article was in preparation, there were no significant judicial
interpretations of the federal corporate Sentencing Guidelines (the "Sen-
tencing Guidelines" or the "Guidelines") from the courts, and no empiri-
cal data were available from the Commission on the actual operation of
the Guidelines.'
Therefore, at this point we have only the corporate sentencing rules
themselves, the tortured history of their development, and predictions
about their ultimate impact. When more information becomes available
on the Sentencing Guidelines in practice, we will be able to assess their
effects more accurately. Let us hope that the future findings on the im-
pact of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines are unexpectedly favorable
for the health of our economy and our polity, because the current out-
look is bleak. On their face, and based upon what we know of the think-
(1989). The Commission's unusual function and placement within the government led to attacks on
the Commission's constitutionality under the separation-of-powers doctrine. The Supreme Court
resolved these challenges in favor of the Commission in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989). However, the Mistretta decision is predicated on a view of the Commission's function that
does not embrace the type of legislative-style policymaking embodied in the new corporate Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. Therefore, as the Article discusses below, the Guidelines-in addition to many other
infirmities--continue to expose the Commission to attack on separation-of-powers grounds.
3. The term "corporate Sentencing Guidelines" is used in this Article, even though the Guide-
lines technically apply to all organizations. The federal criminal code defines "organization" as "a
person other than an individual," 18 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). Under general federal statutory law, the
term "organization" includes corporations as well as partnerships, associations, and societies,
whether or not operated for profit. See I U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (definition of "person" or "whoever" as
used in federal statutes). However, most of the organizations actually prosecuted in federal courts
and sentenced under the Guidelines are business corporations. See Parker, supra note 2, at 518-33.
4. The Sentencing Guidelines for organizations are contained in Chapter Eight of UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
That chapter was added by amendment 422, effective November 1, 1991. See id. at U.S.S.G. app. C,
at 245-49. Like the initial guidelines for individuals, see supra note I, the Commission issued the
corporate Sentencing Guidelines accompanied by a background report that detailed their develop-
ment, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING
GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS (1991) (hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. Although the
Commission disavows its own report as the statutorily required "statement of reasons" for its guide-
lines, see id. at i (Introduction), that report, together with the official "commentary" appearing in
the Guidelines Manual, are the best sources for determining what, if anything, forms the basis for the
Guidelines' provisions.
5. Research for this Article did not locate any reported decisions as of December 1992. In-
quiries to the Sentencing Commission regarding sentences imposed under the Guidelines indicated
that two cases had been sentenced under the Guidelines. However, because the Commission refused
to provide the names, docket numbers, or any other detailed information, retrieval of the publicly
available court documents was impracticable. Telephone Interviews with Michael Courlander &
Pamela Montgomery, Sentencing Commission staff (Nov. 1992 through Jan. 7, 1993).
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ing that animated their provisions, the corporate Sentencing Guidelines
are a disaster for sentencing policy, and another blow to the American
economy.
For the Sentencing Guidelines are the rules "without": without any
rational basis in coherent sentencing policy for their core structure; with-
out statutory authority for many of their key features; and without con-
stitutional validity to some of their more startling innovations. What the
corporate Sentencing Guidelines do contain is the unmistakable imprint
of statism: an authoritarian desire to replace private incentive with pub-
lic bureaucratic control of business activity, under the pretext of prevent-
ing crime. This may make for good politics, and that may be the only
point of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines.
There always has been an important component of political theater to
crime and punishment: the morality play of evil receiving its just desert
seems to be popular, at least so long as the price of admission is not too
high. When the time comes actually to impose sentences in particular
cases, the saving grace of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines may well
be their permeability. The Guidelines are a lawyer's dream of ambiguous
phrases, complex provisos, and diffuse factual determinations that will
defy effective appellate review. Many of the key provisions are deliber-
ately open-ended, thereby allowing sentencing courts considerable discre-
tion in defining the operative rules of law. The incidence of federal
prosecution against corporations is so low6 that, without a major in-
6. As of the mid-1980s, federal corporate prosecutions averaged about 400 annually, as com-
pared with an annual total of approximately 55,000 defendants prosecuted in federal courts; about
305 of those corporations were convicted and sentenced, meaning that the average federal judge
sentenced one corporation every 21 months. Parker, supra note 2, at 521; see also id. 522-33, 594-
604 (providing more detailed data on offenses, firms, and sanctions); Mark A. Cohen, Corporate
Crime and Punishment: A Study of Soial Harm and Sentencing Practice in the Federal Court
1984-87, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 605 (1989). Only 11% of the firms convicted had 50 or more
employees and $1 million or more in sales, only 3% had publicly traded stock, and only 2% were
"Forbes-500" companies. Parker, supra note 2, at 522 n.24.
The volume of corporate prosecution, and the size of the typical corporate defendant, may or may
not have increased during the late 1980s. In a 1990 update to his earlier study, Mark Cohen found
little change in the volume of firms sentenced (324 firms sentenced annually as opposed to a prior
average of 305) or the size of the firms involved (4.6% publicly traded and 15% crossing the 50
employee/S1 million sales threshold, versus 3% and 11%, respectively) from a full set of 1988 data,
but found some indication of increased firm size in a partial set of 1989-90 data. Mark A. Cohen,
Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-90,
71 B.U. L. REv. 247, 251-52 (1991). The Commission's background report on the Guidelines,
which appeared in August 1991 (still containing only partial data for 1990), indicates a fairly level
volume of prosecution, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at ch. 3, tbl. 8 (reporting 328 cor-
porate sentencings in 1988, 273 in 1989, and 173 for the first six months of 1990); but also reports
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crease, it will be years before the pattern of actual outcomes filters up
through the Commission to potential public disclosure. In the meantime,
the prosecutors will have a free hand in their few high-profile cases, the
Commission will have its zero-tolerance rhetoric, academics can wring
their hands, and business leaders can furrow their brows in concerned
attention to the problem. Everyone else probably will nod knowingly
and enjoy the performances. If we are lucky, the admission price of yet
another drain on the vitality of the economy will not be devastating in its
effects on citizens' jobs and purchasing power.
More disturbingly, however, this somewhat cynical vision probably is
the best case scenario for the public welfare. If the Guidelines are taken
at the face value of their rhetoric, the scenarios could be much worse. If
applied to the limits of their potential, the Sentencing Guidelines could
become a potent weapon of oppression and destruction. Furthermore,
even if that potential is never realized, there remains the question of how
such a product ever could issue from an agency of the United States gov-
ernment as putative law. Therefore, albeit with the fondest hope of being
justifiably criticized in retrospect as hyperbole by one of those hand-
wringing academics,7 this Article is devoted to addressing (1) what is
wrong with the corporate Sentencing Guidelines, (2) how it went wrong,
and (3) what, if anything, can be done to rectify the situation, should that
become necessary.
that the percentage of convicted corporations with "openly-traded" stock had grown from 5.8% in
1988 to about 10% in 1989-90.
Thus, although the volume of corporate sentencings appears to have remained essentially constant
for the past seven years, the targets of federal prosecution may have shifted somewhat. Moreover,
the Sentencing Guidelines, which dramatically increase average penalties and explicitly punish orga-
nizational size, may have a "supply effect" of encouraging the government to prosecute more and
larger corporations. The currently available data do not permit an assessment of whether and how
this effect will influence prosecutions.
7. In addition to that charge, some may also criticize me as an ex-staff member at the Com-
mission (Deputy Chief Counsel, 1987-88), and as a veteran of some of the early battles in the corpo-
rate sentencing wars (principal drafter of the 1988 "Discussion Draft," see United States Sentencing
Commission, Draft of Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements for Organizations, 10 WHrTIER
L. REV. 7 (1988)). Such criticisms generally are accompanied by adjectives such as "disgruntled" or
"disappointed," either expressly stated or implied by context or innuendo. To all such criticisms, I
quote Blackstone's "postscript" to the preface of his Commentaries, responding to his critics:
[W]here [the author] thought the objections ill-founded, he hath left, and shall leave, the
book to defend itself; being fully of opinion, that if his principles be false and his doctrines
unwarrantable, no apology from himself can make them right; if founded in truth and
rectitude, no censure from others can make them wrong.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, author's preface, at xxxix
(1766) (William Carey Jones ed., 1916).
[Vol. 71:397
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Essentially, what is wrong with the Guidelines is that they are rules
"without"-without rationality, without authority, without constitution-
ality. What went wrong is an old pattern of deficiency in government
that seems to recur in endless variation: power without adequate disci-
pline becomes tyranny. The possible solutions are equally simple: rein-
force the discipline, or withdraw the power. The former tends to be a
risky strategy for a free people, for most disciplinary procedures can be
circumvented. Therefore, perhaps it is time to reexamine whether the
power should be granted at all, that is, whether the Sentencing Commis-
sion should be put out of the business of corporate sentencing.
I. RULES WITHOUT RATIONALITY
The most fundamental requisite of all law is rationality. Unfortu-
nately, the corporate Sentencing Guidelines do not meet even this mini-
mal requirement, for they neither rest on a coherent theory of
punishment nor are they linked with the accumulated wisdom of past
sentencing practice.
Oliver Wendell Holmes' most famous aphorism was that "[t]he life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience."' One need not agree
or disagree with Holmes, however, to see that those two possibilities-
follow the experience of courts, or develop a coherent logical theory-
exhaust the options for rationally-based sentencing guidelines promul-
gated by a politically unresponsive sentencing commission. A politically
representative body, such as Congress, may have a third option of simply
reflecting the political preferences of its constituencies. But there is no
such option open to the United States Sentencing Commission under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, particularly as the Act was construed by
the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States 9 to uphold the constitu-
tionality of the Commission expressly on the ground that the Commis-
sion was not invested with "political authority" of any kind, but rather
was constituted as an "expert body" to engage in the "neutral endeavor"
of rationalizing the judicial process of sentencing."0 The majority's opin-
ion in Mistretta rested critically on the distinction between the permissi-
8. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Little, Brown & Co. 1938)
(1881).
9. 488 U.S. 361, 396, 407, 412 (1989).
10. For a complete discussion of the Mistretta decision and a development of its implications
for the Commission's institutional competence, see Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sen-
tencing Commission, P.M. (Post-Mistretta): Sunshine orSunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289 (1989).
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ble nonpolitical role of the Commission and what the dissenting Justice
Scalia characterized as a "junior-varsity Congress." The Sentencing
Commission simply is not permitted constitutionally to function as an
inferior legislature.
This same distinction is reflected in the provisions of the Sentencing
Reform Act itself,11 which requires the Commission to develop its guide-
lines from the "starting point" of past sentencing practice. 12 Deviations
from average past practice sentences are permitted only if the Commis-
sion makes a finding, after empirical study, that the past sentence levels
were inadequate.13 Increases in sentence levels are limited to sentences
that are "sufficient, but not greater than necessary," 14 to comply with the
statutory purposes of sentencing, in accordance with "advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice pro-
ess' 15 and as evaluated through Commission-developed "means of mea-
suring the degree to which [sentencing practices are] ... effective." 16
Like Holmes, the Sentencing Reform Act gives primacy to "experi-
ence"-average past sentencing practice. The Act permits "logic" to jus-
tify deviations, but only upon the most rigorous showing of the
inadequacy of past practice and the necessity for change, especially when
the change is to the basic structure or average punishment levels.
11. For a fully developed discussion of the points summarized here see Parker & Block, supra
note 10, at 292-315. That article argues that the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, in them-
selves and as interpreted by the Court in Mistretta, require the Sentencing Commission to direct its
guidelines toward improving the efficiency of the federal sentencing system, with efficiency taken in
the economic or utilitarian sense of minimizing the costs of both crime and punishment combined.
Id. at 293. For present purposes, however, the decisive points are less rigorous: (1) the Commission
cannot operate as an inferior legislature, a constraint inherent in the Mistretta rationale; and (2) to
the extent that the Commission deviates from past experience, it must act only on the basis of a
logically coherent theory of sentencing policy, whether or not that theory recognizes the requirement
of efficiency. This less rigorous restatement of the requirement is sufficient here because the Guide-
lines lack logical coherence under any theory.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1988).
13. The Act provides that while the Commission must use average sentences as a starting point,
it is "not bound by such average sentences." 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). The legislative history explains
that the Commission "need not follow the current average sentences if it finds that they do not
adequately reflect the purposes of sentencing." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183 [hereinater S. REP. No. 225]; see also id. at 61 ("[Ihe Sentenc-
ing Commission will be able, if necessary, to change those [past] practices."). See Parker & Block,
supra note 10, at 297-300 (developing this and other aspects of the Sentencing Reform Act and its
legislative history).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2).
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Thus, under the Sentencing Reform Act, the Commission must follow
one or a combination of both of two generic approaches to developing
sentencing guidelines: (1) on the basis of a coherent set of sentencing
principles; or (2) on the basis of prior experience, as reflected in past
sentencing practice in the federal courts. In the case of the original
guidelines for individual sentencing 7-though perhaps not in subsequent
amendmentsl -the Commission essentially chose the second of these
two approaches, by promulgating guidelines developed from empirical
analysis of past practice, and without major changes from average past
sentence levels. But in the case of the Sentencing Guidelines for organi-
zations, the Commission followed neither of the permissible approaches:
the corporate Guidelines are intended to increase punishment levels radi-
cally and arbitrarily, doing so on motivations that are incoherent as sen-
tencing policy.
A. Punishment Without Principle
The basic idea of the Sentencing Guidelines for corporations is de-
scribed by the Commission itself as a "carrot-and-stick approach." 9
Even as metaphor, that phrase is not well-chosen: the "stick" clearly is
the radical increase in overall penalty levels; but the "carrot" apparently
is intended to refer to a somewhat smaller "stick" that will be applied
when convicted corporations have performed the tricks desired by the
Commission. However, as I have pointed out previously,20 this type of
17. The initial sentencing guidelines for individuals followed the general punishment levels and,
with some exceptions, the distribution of punishment under past practice. See Initial Guidelines,
supra note 1, at 18,047-053; INITIAL SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-17; Parker &
Block, supra note 10, at 315-18.
18. The problem of non-empirically based amendments arose in 1989 in the midst of controver-
sies over corporate sentencing. See Michael K. Block, Emerging Problems in the Sentencing Com-
mission's Approach to Guidelines Amendments, 1 FED. SENTENCING REP. 451 (1989).
19. The phrase appeared in a statement entitled Overview that accompanied the Commission's
October 1990 draft proposals. The approach of that draft was carried over to the final 1991 promul-
gation of the Sentencing Guidelines. A contemporary article by the Commission's Chairman ex-
plained the phrase:
In summary, the guidelines draft currently under consideration takes an approach that
rewards the organization for actions to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its agents,
but significantly punishes the organization that does not have its house in order. It is a
carrot and stick approach-quite simply, it rewards the good and punishes the bad.
William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 118, 120 (1990).
20. Parker, supra note 1, at 136. Professor Coffee of Columbia Law School voiced a somewhat
similar critique of the indeterminacy of the plan. John C. Coffee, Jr., "Carrot and Stick"Sentencing:
Structuring Incentives for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 126 (1990). Cof-
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populist notion, though politically attractive in conjuring up images of
corporations jumping through hoops, cannot be equated with a rational
sentencing policy.
Both the sizing of the "stick" and the tricks necessary to obtain the
"carrot" are what matter to sentencing policy, and on these dimensions,
the Commission's Guidelines are very likely to be destructive. The
"stick" may be large enough to beat the American economy senseless,
but destruction for its own sake is not rational law enforcement policy.
Furthermore, consuming the "carrot" may be even worse, because the
"carrot" appears to be poisonous. Certainly, neither the Commission
nor anyone else has any basis for believing that the "carrot" has nutri-
tional value, and our knowledge and experience of the sorts of tricks de-
sired by the Commission-all of which are predicated on the notion that
central bureaucratic control works better than individual incentive or
market discipline-tell us that they are more likely to impoverish the
American consumer than to prevent crime.
From this perspective, the Commission's awkward metaphor is re-
vealing: as the "carrot" turns out to be just another "stick," the Com-
mission's approach to corporate guidelines is revealed to be a policy of
punishment for its own sake, which is punishment without principle.
L The Big "'Stick"
Under the Sentencing Guidelines for corporations, an organization's
fine is computed as a "base fine" times a "multiplier," which in turn is
based on a "culpability score."2 Where do the numbers come from?
According to the Commission's background report, both the base fine
and the multiplier were chosen to make guideline fines overlap with stat-
utory maximum penalties. Furthermore, the base fine is defined as the
greatest of three possible numbers-gain, loss, and an arbitrary "offense
level" amount 22 -thus adding an arbitrary structure to the arbitrary fine
levels. The Commission articulated no coherent principle whatsoever for
fee's primary concern was that "the 'stick' may be illusory" because many convicted corporations
might earn a high "mitigation score" (since then inverted into a "culpability score" in the final
guidelines). Id. at 126. He also doubted the "carrot," noting that its effect was "to force the imple-
mentation of particular monitoring and control strategies that are still of unproven efficacy," and
that it "may be vulnerable to manipulation." Id. at 128; see also Michael K. Block, Guest Editor's
Observations, 3 FED. SENrrNcING RP. 115, 117 (1990) (noting the plan's lack of economic ration-
ality, which could actually cause an increase in crime).
21. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, §§ 8C2.4-8C2.7.
22. Id. § 8C2.4(a).
[Vol. 71:397
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making any of these choices. They simply are arbitrary expressions of a
set of preferences held by the Commissioners.
Arbitrary Levels I: Guideline Fines at the Statutory Maxima. By defi-
nition, sentencing guidelines are intended to deal with average or typical
cases, leaving unusual or extreme cases to the sentencing courts' "depar-
ture" authority. In fact, this is the approach of the Commission's sen-
tencing guidelines for individuals.23 However, it is not true of the
corporate Sentencing Guidelines: unlike the remainder of the guidelines,
the corporate Sentencing Guidelines were constructed deliberately to
"accommodate" statutory maximum penalties.24 Why? The Commis-
sion never says, but this is one of several aspects of the corporate Guide-
lines in which the Commission goes for the highest possible number
whenever there is a choice. The only "principle" here is to inflict damage
on corporations.
Arbitrary Levels II: Offense Levels as "Seriousness." As one of three
measures of the base fine, the corporate Sentencing Guidelines specify a
figure linked to the offense level table of the guidelines for individuals,25
on the apparent view that the offense level is an alternate to gain or loss
as a measure of the "seriousness" of the offense.2" As noted above, the
precise numbers assigned to the offense levels, and the rate of change
between the numbers, were chosen arbitrarily.27 But in addition, the
23. The Commission stated that "each guideline [is] carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical
cases." U.S.S.G., supra note 4, ch. 1, at 5. The individual guidelines generally do base guideline
sentence levels on average past practice outcomes. See INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra
note 1, at 17, 22-39. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, sentencing courts are required to follow the
Commission's guidelines, subject to the authority to "depart" when "the court finds that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into con-
sideration by... the guidelines." 18 U.S.C § 3553(b).
24. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-15.
25. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.4(d); cf id., ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing tbl.).
26. "As a general rule, the base fine measures the seriousness of the offense." U.S.S.G., supra
note 4, § 8C2.4, (comment. (backg'd.)).
27. See supra note 24. In particular, the Commission set offense level amounts by "backing
out" from the statutory maximum fines, under an assumed multiplier of two, which is the maximum
multiplier at a culpability score of five, and the minimum multiplier at a culpability score of 10.
U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.6. Thus, as the Commission's own background report states, "in a
case involving no aggravating or mitigating factors (Le, with a culpability score of five), the court
would be able to impose the statutory maximum fine" without departing from the Guidelines. SuP-
PLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 14. In other words, the Guidelines set guideline penalties
for typical cases at the statutory maxima, which Congress intended not for the typical case, but
rather "for an offense committed under the most egregious of circumstances." S. REP. No. 225,
supra note 13, at 114 (discussing maximum imprisonment terms under the Sentencing Reform Act).
This feature has an almost comical circularity as applied by the Commission to the higher fine
Washington University Open Scholarship
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original offense level structure never was and cannot be a scale of "seri-
ousness," because it was developed from entirely different considerations
for entirely different purposes.
In fact, the offense level structure of the original guidelines is purely an
artifact of the empirical approach used to develop those guidelines. The
original guidelines' offense levels were, in essence, the coefficients found
in multiple regression analyses of past imprisonment sentences;28 they are
not derived from the "seriousness" of the underlying offense conduct, but
are based upon the unique characteristics of imprisonment of individuals
as a sanction, and have no rational application whatever to the determi-
nation of fines for organizations. Moreover, the offense level structure is
not an arithmetic scale of any kind, because the underlying regression
analyses were logarithmic: the offense level number itself is an exponent.
This is why imprisonment sentences increase by about twelve percent per
offense level. In other words, the sentencing table of the individual
guidelines is, in effect, a compound interest table at a twelve percent in-
terest rate. Given the multiple factors that bear on the determination of
an imprisonment sentence-such as an individual offender's responsive-
ness to varying lengths of imprisonment-it cannot be said that, for ex-
ample, a level seventeen offense necessarily is more serious than a level
sixteen offense. The only thing that the offense level table tells us is that,
among the 10,000 sentencings of individuals used to develop the original
guidelines, on average the level seventeen offender was sentenced to
maxima established by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act. In the Act, Congress did raise
statutory fine maxima. However, it was reacting not only to a perceived insufficiency in the maxi-
mum (not average) levels, but also to "large and logically inexplicable disparities in the levels of fines
permitted as criminal sanctions for offenses of essentially similar natures." Id. at 104. In raising the
maximum fine limits, Congress sought "to permit considerable flexibility in tailoring the fine level to
the situation in a particular case," id. at 108, "without implying that sentences have been rational-
ized-a step which ... should be undertaken with the assistance of the Department of Justice, the
United States Sentencing Commission, and other interested agencies, after passage of this bill." Id.
at 87. Thus, Congress intended the maximum fine levels as a temporary stopgap, and looked to the
Commission for assistance in the ultimate task of rationalization. But when the Commission devel-
oped the Sentencing Guidelines, it relied on the same stopgap measures as if they represented a
congressional "rationalization" and a definitive statement of policy as to "seriousness"-another
subject on which Congress looked to the Commission for advice and assistance. See id. at 86-88.
This sort of "I've got it, you take it" interchange reminds one more of an Abbott and Costello
routine than it does of government policymaking with serious implications for the nation's welfare.
28. See INMAL SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note I, chs. 3, 4 (providing full details). At
the time of that report, the Commission itself had no delusions about whether the "offense level"
table was a "seriousness" scale, and specifically disavowed the notion that the system reflected a just
desert approach of scaling penalties in relation to severity or seriousness. See id. at 15-17.
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about twelve percent more months in prison than the level sixteen of-
fender. There is nothing more universal in offense levels than this partic-
ular empirical finding.
Thus, the Commission's extension of the offense level system to corpo-
rate sentencing is merely playing around with numbers that have nothing
to do with the problem of corporate sentencing, or with either of the two
principal forms-fines and probation-of corporate sanctions.
Arbitrary Structure P Find the Highest Number. Under the corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, the base fine is highest of three numbers: (1) the
arbitrary offense level number; (2) "the pecuniary gain to the organiza-
tion from the offense," or (3) "the pecuniary loss from the offense caused
by the organization, to the extent the loss was caused intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly."29 Of those three, only loss has something to
do with a rational sentencing policy. But let us put aside that point for
the moment and ask: why the highest of the three? The Commission
provides no coherent answer.
Apparently, the Commission's idea is that loss, gain, and the offense
level amount are alternative measures of "the seriousness of the of-
fense."' 30 At least that admission dispels any remaining doubt about the
offense level table being a "seriousness" scale. But it still does not answer
why the highest number is appropriate. Why not the lowest? Or, if the
Commission is so uncertain of its "seriousness" evaluations, why not the
average of the three? In order to find the answer, we must read carefully
between the lines of the Commission's oblique explanation:
The determinants of the base fine are selected so that, in conjunction with
the multipliers.. . , they will result in guideline fine ranges appropriate to
deter organizational criminal conduct and to provide incentives for organi-
zations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and re-
porting criminal conduct. 31
Now, let us try to translate the explanation: because we know how the
levels were selected, we now know what "guideline fine ranges appropri-
ate to deter" means-it means statutory maximum fines. In plain Eng-
lish, the Commission wants a big stick, the biggest that Congress will
allow. We also know why: so that corporations will consume the "car-
rot"-"internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting
criminal conduct," but only those satisfactory to the Commission, as
29. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.4(a).
30. Id. (comment. (backg'd.)).
31. Id.
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other parts of the Sentencing Guidelines specify. In other words, the
Commission prefers the highest number because it gives the govern-
ment-Commission, prosecutors, and courts-the most leverage over the
internal mechanisms of private firms.
Arbitrary Structure I: The Obsession with "Pecuniary Gain." Both in
the base fine provisions and elsewhere in the Sentencing Guidelines, the
Commission singles out one concept for special attention: what the Com-
mission calls "pecuniary gain" and defines as "the additional before-tax
profit to the defendant resulting from the relevant conduct of the of-
fense," specifically including "either additional revenue or cost sav-
ings."32 Unlike the alternate measure of "pecuniary loss," which can be
blocked from consideration when it was not "caused intentionally, know-
ingly, or recklessly,"33 pecuniary gain need not be "caused" at all but
may only "result" from the offense, and it may result completely acciden-
tally. Under the Commission's Guidelines, profit-making is a strict lia-
bility offense that does not require a showing of causation.
Repeated references to the possibility of "gain" throughout the Guide-
lines make it clear that the Commission can conceive of no more evil
thing than the prospect that someone might make a profit. One explana-
tion for the structure of the base fine is "to deter organizations from
seeking to obtain financial reward through criminal conduct," and there-
fore, "when greatest, pecuniary gain to the organization is used."34
Whether or not it is used, the Guidelines also contain a special provision,
entitled "disgorgement," 35 which "is designed to ensure that the amount
of any gain that has not and will not be taken from the organization for
remedial purposes will be added to the fine."3 6 Thus, even when the
harm of the offense can be repaired for less, the Commission wants to
ensure that any residual gain is, in the Commission's own word, "taken"
by the government. And even when otherwise recognizing a basis for
downward departure in exceptional circumstances, the Commission adds
the proviso that "such fine should not be lower than if determined under
§ 8C2.4(a)(2),"37 which is the provision calling for a fine based on pecu-
niary gain.
32. Id. § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3 (h))).
33. Id. § 8C2.4(a)(3).
34. Id. § 8C2.4 (comment. (backg'd.)).
35. Id. § 8C2.9. "
36. Id. (comment. (n.1)).
37. Id. § 8C4.11.
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Obviously, all of Commission's attention to pecuniary gain will pro-
duce a field day for litigation lawyers and a nightmare of administration
for the courts (if they take it seriously at all),38 especially because there is
very little experience in law generally, and virtually none in prior sen-
tencing practice,39 with such determinations. The difference in treatment
between loss and gain, the ambiguity created by using "profit" as if it
were synonymous with "revenue," and the tax treatment,' are all highly
provocative features. One can imagine endless litigation over the differ-
ence between a "caused" loss and a "resulting" gain, among numerous
other issues. Should the expenses of producing the "illicit" gain be offset
in determining the pretax profit? Just what is the illicit aspect of a gain?
If the same gain would have resulted from noncriminal conduct, is it still
a "gain"? Because firms probably do not often keep a ledger entitled
"criminal gains," who bears the burden of proof and of uncertainty? Can
gain be estimated by labeling a particular department or line of business
as illicit or "infected" by criminal behavior? What if the offense gain is
negative? These questions could be multiplied indefinitely.
But the administrative difficulties, though formidable, are beside the
main point, which is that gain has nothing whatever to do with a rational
sentencing policy. Although it is tempting to believe that a gain-based
penalty is an appropriate deterrence policy, actually this is a fallacy. It
simply disconnects sentencing from the rationale for the substantive
criminal prohibition, and therefore always leads to inappropriate re-
38. Under the amorphous standard of "to the extent that the calculation of either pecuniary
gain or pecuniary loss would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process," U.S.S.G.
§ 8C2.4(c), the Sentencing Guidelines supply the courts with an escape hatch from determinations of
either loss or gain. It remains undetermined how often, and on what bases, the courts will choose
this escape route. However, if appellate courts do not police this option rigorously, it obviously
opens a large hole in the tripartite base fine structure.
39. The best empirical information is that gain did not constitute a significant factor in past
sentencing practice. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 18 & tbl. 3 (showing no system-
atic relationship between fines and gain).
40. For example, the use of the phrase "additional before-tax profit" is interesting because it
makes the government a beneficiary of the illegal activity: the more criminal gains, the more tax
revenue. Furthermore, the IRS may take a "heads-I-win/tails-you-lose" approach to this subject by
disallowing deductions associated with the criminal profit under § 162(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code, and imposing yet another penalty for the crime of deducting the criminal expenses. See I.R.C.
§§ 7701-7707. Thus, the convicted firm first pays tax on its profits, then pays more tax on any
disallowed deductions (with possible further penalties). In addition, the firm then pays a fine based
on the "pre-tax profit." It may not deduct that payment because it is a fine, § 162(f), and therefore
again pays income tax on the fine.
Washington University Open Scholarship
410 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 71:397
suits. 41 Congress does not define conduct as criminal because it results in
a gain to the offender, but rather because it produces an actual or poten-
tial harm to others. By basing a sentence on the different criterion of
gain, the Commission is disregarding the substantive rationale for the
prohibition,42 and therefore is following neither law nor rationality in
sentencing policy.
However, such a sentencing structure does do one thing, aside from
providing work for future generations of lawyers and judges: it imposes
yet another burden on all profit-making activity.
2. The Poisonous "Carrot"
As this Article noted earlier, the big "stick" is nothing other than arbi-
trarily high penalties, chosen through a curious structure that reflects
only the idea of finding the highest penalty possible, and evinces a hostil-
ity toward the corporate form in general and the "pecuniary gain" in
particular. However, the main point of brandishing the "stick" is to
force every organization to consume the "carrot," or, more accurately, to
jump through the hoops necessary to reach the "carrot," which in fact is
only a slightly smaller "stick."
If every corporation did consume the "carrot," then they would be
beaten with only the smaller "stick." But this does not mean that the big
"stick" is irrelevant, because corporations' incentives to consume the
41. For a developed analysis, see Parker, supra note 2, at 554-63; for a more general analysis,
see Jeffrey S. Parker, Avoidance Costs in Optimal Penalties (Jan. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). For analysis within the specific context of corporate sentencing proposals, see
Parker, supra note 1, at 135; 1990 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 448-51 (post-hearing statement
of Jeffrey S. Parker).
42. The simple example given in the 1990 House Hearings illustrates the point:
[Clonsider the example of two environmental offenses involving illegal dumping of wastes:
case I involves a large volume of rubbish, unsightly but otherwise relatively harmless,
dumped on the side of the road; case 2 involves a small amount of highly toxic material in
highly concentrated from [sic] poured into a river in a densely populated area. In such
cases, "gain" ordinarily is considered to be the saved cost of lawful disposal. Assume (as is
likely to be the case) that the cost of lawful disposal is very high for the rubbish but low for
the toxic material. Clearly, a strictly gain-based penalty is entirely backwards in these
circumstances. But even the "greater of" penalty distorts the relative severity of the two
offenses, and thereby unwisely distorts the incentives given to potentially offending firms in
terms of prevention: public policy should encourage the firms to concentrate proportion-
ately more resources on preventing toxic dumping, but that differential has been obscured
by the penalty system. Now consider why the dumping was prohibited in the first place.
Certainly, it was not to reduce the profits of the potentially offending firms, but rather to
protect the environment against harm. Thus, the gradations implied by the substantive
policy now also have been muted by the gain-based or "greater of" sentencing policy.
1990 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 449-50 (post-hearing statement of Jeffrey S. Parker).
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"carrot" will be determined by the imposing size of the big "stick."
Nonetheless, if the "carrot" were known to have nutritional value up to
the expected size of the big "stick," then at least the fining provisions of
the Guidelines perhaps could be saved from destructive irrationality.
Unfortunately, however, there is no reason to believe that the Commis-
sion's "carrot" is nutritive; and there is every reason exists to believe that
in fact it is poisonous to our economy, if not to our society more gener-
ally. The carrot is statism--central economic planning by government,
undisciplined by market forces, carefully measured penalties, or, for that
matter, any other effective legal or political constraint.
The principal vehicle of the Sentencing Guidelines for administering
the "carrot" is the culpability score used to determine the size of the
multiplier to be applied to the base fine-the more "carrot" consumed
beforehand, the smaller the "stick" applied.43 However, the same im-
pulses also are reflected in the Guidelines' provisions for supervisory pro-
bation sentences designed to force-feed the "carrot"-after a thorough
beating with the big "stick"-to corporations for which the threat was
insufficient.' In both instances, the contents of the "carrot" are essen-
tially the same: the Commission has legislated that corporations subject
to the laws of the United States, at least those with fifty or more employ-
ees, shall have a bureaucracy to "prevent and detect violations of law,"4
and that the precise composition and activities of that bureaucracy will
be dictated by a new government bureaucracy within the federal judici-
ary. The probation guidelines directly mandate the compliance bureau-
cracy, while the fining guidelines enforce it by giving the corporation a
higher culpability score and therefore a larger multiplier if it lacks the
prescribed form of bureaucracy.
As with the fine levels generally, the numbers for the culpability score
were chosen arbitrarily: the arbitrary multipliers simply were divided
into ten increments, each now called a point in the culpability score. All
defendants begin at the midpoint, and go up or down depending upon
whether they have jumped through the specified hoops either before or
after the offense, have had previous brushes with public law enforcement
(civil or criminal), and have cooperated with the government's investiga-
tion of the instant offense.46 In addition to its centerpiece of the compli-
43. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, §§ 8C2.4-C2.6.
44. See id. § 8D1.1.
45. Id. § 8C2.5(O.
46. See id. § 8C2.5.
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ance bureaucracy, the culpability score features some interesting new
legislation by the Commission on organizational "intent," introducing
some concepts into federal sentencing that previously have been un-
known in federal criminal law, or, for that matter, any criminal law.
Among these include the ideas of culpability by "corporate culture" and
punishment based on size alone, which have been fixtures of statist criti-
ques of the free enterprise system for decades.47 Those features, together
with the mandated compliance bureaucracy answering to a government
bureaucracy, go very far toward creating a regime of central bureaucratic
planning of the American economy, which all of our knowledge and ex-
perience tells us is poison to our material well-being, and to our
freedoms.
Guilt by "Culture." A large portion of the Commission's culpability
score (up to five points, with the exact amount depending solely upon the
organization's size as an indicator of its "culpability"), depends upon a
new construct of corporate culpability that approximates the idea that a
corporation's "culture" or "atmosphere" can be characterized as good or
bad.
To implement this idea, the Sentencing Guidelines invent a number of
new culpability concepts and definitions, based on two new categories of
corporate agents: "high-level personnel" and "substantial authority per-
sonnel," viewed with respect to either the organization as a whole or "the
unit of the organization within which the offense was committed.14 8
Both are defined expansively. "Substantial authority personnel" is de-
fined so broadly as to be completely unpredictable in advance, and inten-
tionally so. As the Commission states: "Whether an individual falls
within this category must be determined on a case-by-case basis." 9
47. The idea that business activity created a "bad" culture which produced violations of the law
was central to the theories of Edwin Sutherland, the sociologist who coined the term "white collar
crime." See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME-THE UNCUT VERSION, ch. 15 (Gil-
bert Geis & Colin Goffeds., 1983). Later attacks, such as those by Ralph Nader, focused principally
on large size as the problem needing correction. See, eg., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE
GIANT CORPORATION (1976) (proposing federal chartering and supervision of the largest firms in
the United States).
48. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.5(b) (culpability determinations); see also id. § 8A1.2
(comment. (n.1)) (definitions of "high-level" and "substantial authority" personnel).
49. Id. § 8AI.2 (comment. (n.3(c))). The basic definition of "individuals who within the scope
of their authority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of an organization,"
id., would seem to include any employee whose job is other than machine-like. The Commission
confirms that such persons need not be "part of an organization's management," and gives examples
such as sales personnel. Id. For instance, consider customer service representatives assigned to
[Vol. 71:397
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/8
1993] CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 413
Thus, the definitions give us very little guidance in advance for which
personnel will fall into these categories.
Whoever these people are, if (1) a member of "high-level personnel" in
what the Commission apparently considers a "larger" firm (200 or more
employees) or "substantial authority personnel" in smaller firms (10-
199), "participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the of-
fense;" or (2) for the larger firms only, "tolerance of the offense by sub-
stantial authority personnel was pervasive throughout the organization,"
or a sub-unit, then in either case the organization receives an increase in
its culpability score, depending upon the size of the organization or the
unit. 0 Except for the explicit size penalty, some of this may sound
vaguely familiar to lawyers as similar to the "superior agent" standard of
corporate criminal liability in state law," x and the "willful blindness"
concept of mens rea in general criminal law. 2 But in fact, the Commis-
sion's concepts are quite different and radically broader, to the extent
that they are intelligible at all.
Whereas the undefined "participated in" may not be objectionable in
itself (if it is limited by the criminal law doctrine of complicity), "con-
doned" is defined broadly to mean "knew of the offense and did not take
reasonable steps to prevent or terminate the offense." 3 "Willful igno-
rance" is not the equivalent of criminal law "willful blindness"-which is
a form of knowledge meaning that "the person is aware of a high
probability of [a fact's] existence, unless he actually believes that it does
not exist," as it is expressed by the Model Penal Code.54 The Commis-
sion's definition is much broader-essentially, it is negligent non-suspi-
cion of a legal conclusion rather than a fact: "An individual was
'willfully ignorant of the offense' if the individual did not investigate the
answer consumer complaints. Without a verbatim script, these employees would appear to exercise
discretion in, exactly how they respond to the consumer.
50. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.5(b)(l)-(5). Presumably, this structure reflects the assump-
tion that "smaller" firms do not have "high-level personnel" or that those personnel cannot be dis-
tinguished from "substantial authority personnel" in the smaller firms. In either case, the size of the
addition to the culpability score is directly related to firm size. See infra notes 59-68 and accompa-
nying text.
51. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 3.10(c) (2d ed. 1986).
52. See generally id. § 3.5(b).
53. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8AI.2 (comment. (n.3(e))).
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985). Although some variation among American juris-
dictions exists, the majority rule limits willful blindness to something closely approximating actual
knowledge, and excludes negligent blindness. 1 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 51, § 3.5(b) & n.30.
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possible occurrence of unlawful conduct despite knowledge of circum-
stances that would lead a reasonable person to investigate whether un-
lawful conduct had occurred."' "5 The concept of "tolerance" is
undefined, but appears to be even broader (non-negligent non-suspi-
cion?).56 It is accompanied by the equally diffuse concept of "pervasive-
ness," also undefined and again one of those determinations that,
according to the Commission, "will be case specific." '5 7
What does all of this mean? In practical terms, it means years of liti-
gation over the vague terminology employed by the Commission. In
legal and moral terms, it means that the Commission has defined an en-
tirely new range of criminal culpability that has no relationship to any
accepted concept of criminal responsibility. The Commission's construct
is, in effect, a punishment of status alone, or on "bad thoughts" unac-
companied by culpable behavior. 8 In policy terms, it means that firms
now have an incentive to assure that no one who conceivably could be
"high-level" or "substantial authority" personnel ever knows enough to
be guilty of the new offense of non-suspicion of their subordinates. In
terms of rational policy, it means nothing, because there is no indication
from any source that encouraging ignorance within firms' management
has any salutary effect on crime prevention. It does, however, discourage
effective management in general, and thereby paves the way for the Com-
mission-mandated compliance bureaucracy while at the same time inter-
fering with productive activities.
55. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(j))). Obviously, this formulation contains
ambiguities, such as whether the person in question had a duty to investigate-or whether the
Guidelines now impose that duty; whether the standard presupposes or imposes some knowledge of
law; whether the suspicious circumstances had to suggest unlawful conduct of the type represented
by the offense that ultimately occurred; and whether the unlawful conduct that the individual should
have suspected must even be a crime. These and similar points create additional grounds to contest
in litigation.
56. Although the term and its context suggest that tolerance connotes less direct involvement,
the Commission's discussion of the pervasiveness inquiry introduces an ambiguity by suggesting that
perhaps tolerance only means one or more of participation, condonation, or willful ignorance: "Per-
vasiveness . . will be case specific and depend on the number, and degree of responsibility, of
individuals within substantial authority personnel who participated in, condoned, or were willfully
ignorant of the offense." Id. § 8C2.5 (comment. (n.4)).
57. Id. The only thing that the Commission states in assessing pervasiveness is to count the
number of substantial authority individuals who exhibited tolerance, and then weigh their tolerance
by their degree of authority. See id.
58. A basic premise of criminal law is that "conduct, to be criminal, must consist of something
more than a mere bad state of mind .... [Tihis requirement is reflected in court decisions holding
that mere status or condition cannot constitutionally be made a crime." 1 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra
note 51, at 269-70; see also id at 366-69 (discussing traditional standards of corporate liability).
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Big is Bad. The Commission's culpability score adds a second status
penalty based on organizational size alone, with larger organizations tak-
ing a larger hit to their culpability scores for "high-level" or "substantial
authority" personnel involvement, simply because they are larger and for
no other reason. The Commission's background report denies the intent
to punish size alone, 9 but the truth is obvious from an examination of
the rules themselves, which consist of three separate subsections that are
identical except for the specification of the size proxy of the number of
employees and the associated number of culpability points for that size:
five points for 5000 or more employees, four points for 1000 or more
employees, and three points for 200 or more employees, in either the
organization or a unit of it.' Because the only thing that differs as
among these provisions is size, the Commission's assertion-that "the
basis for the increase is not the size of the organization, per se" 6 1-is
simply disingenuous.
What is the Commission's rationale for these provisions? The Com-
mission's background report again is opaque. The Commission essen-
tially concedes that it neither found any such thing in past practice6 2 nor
could even articulate a coherent basis for the size penalty.63 The Com-
mission's background report also hints at the fallacious line of reasoning
that "a larger fine would be needed to sufficiently punish and deter a
larger organization," which is contrary to elementary economics.' But
59. "[Flines can be higher for larger organizations, but the basis for the increase is not the size
of the organization, per se." SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
60. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, §§ 8C2.5(b)(1), (2), (3).
61. See supra note 59.
62. "Empirical evidence failed to illuminate clearly the relationship between the size of an or-
ganization and the fine imposed." SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. In other words,
when controlling for other factors that affected the penalty, such as loss and ability to pay, no rela-
tionship existed between firm size and the fine imposed. See id. at 9.
63. "The Commission's general approach to this conceptually difficult issue was to take the size
of the organization into account." Id. at 9. In other words, the Commissioners wanted to punish
based on firm size, but could not find a legitimate basis for doing so.
64. The background report notes that this idea was proposed to the Commission, but does not
purport to rely upon it. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. This idea has superficial
appeal--suggesting that larger organizations may have higher law compliance costs-but analysis
shows that it is specious. There are two key points. First, an inherent difference exists between
individuals and organizations in terms of wealth: unlike individuals, organizations do not have
"wealth" in the sense that the last dollar of income is less important than the first-what the econo-
mists call diminishing marginal utility of income. Corporations are merely mechanisms for facilitat-
ing efficient production and investment, not ends in themselves. See Parker, supra note 2, at 519,
522-23. Therefore, to a corporation, the last dollar of income is equal to the first, as neither the last
nor the first "belongs" to the corporation in the same sense as an individual. Second, simple eco-
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the official story in the final guideline commentary is even more
disturbing:
[A]s organizations become larger and their managements become more pro-
fessional, participation in, condonation of, or wilful ignorance of criminal
conduct by such management is increasingly a breach of trust or abuse of
position.... [A]s organizations increase in size, the risk of criminal conduct
beyond that reflected in the instant offense also increases whenever manage-
ment's tolerance of that offense is pervasive.
65
At least this passage gives us a better idea of what the Commission actu-
ally is trying to do. Of course, the premise is counter-factual: there is no
necessary, or even likely, correlation between the number of employees of
an organization and the "professionalism" of its management (whatever
that means to the Commission), or whether there is a breach of trust or
abuse of position, when considered without regard to the ownership,
management structure, and activities of an organization. There are many
quite large and successful organizations that are privately owned and
managed by "unprofessional" entrepreneurs. In those situations, whose
trust is being breached?
On a more mundane level, one might ask why organizations and their
subunits are being instructed through these provisions to reduce their
size. There is no evidence or theory suggesting that smaller organiza-
tions control their employees better or commit fewer violations of law.
Indeed, the findings, including some reported by the Commission, seem
to indicate the opposite-that smaller firms may be more prone to viola-
tions.66 Moreover, here again simple economics would tell us that some
nomics indicates that firms differ in size for the same reasons that they differ in other ways-some
firms operate more efficiently at different sizes. If penalties vary with firm size alone, it will disrupt
the normal economic incentives that determine firm size: larger firms will have an incentive to
become smaller simply to reduce penalty exposure without necessarily changing their law compli-
ance level, and smaller firms will have an incentive to reduce their law compliance level. Both of
these effects will tend to impair productive efficiency without reducing, and possibly increasing, the
incidence of crime.
If a court applies an appropriately measured penalty, then both large and small firms will have an
incentive to increase their compliance efforts, because a dollar is a dollar for all firms. The Commis-
sion's size penalty contradicts this logic, and reduces economic efficiency, without showing that the
size penalty improves compliance with the law.
65. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.5 (comment. (backg'd.)).
66. Every empirical study to date, including the Commission's own background report on the
Sentencing Guidelines, has found that large, publicly held firms constitute only a small percentage of
organizational defendants in the federal courts. See supra note 6. Given the scope of these firms'
activities, and the degree of surveillance that the government already exercises over them through
regulatory agencies, it is likely that this finding reflects the obvious-such firms have a lower inci-
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firms become large because they operate more efficiently on a larger
scale; whereas other firms operate more efficiently on a smaller scale. By
giving firms an artificial incentive to be smaller than ordinary market
forces would dictate, the Commission necessarily is acting irrationally by
destroying the economic value of efficient firm sizes for no demonstrated
payoff in terms of crime prevention.
But the Commission's concern in these provisions does not appear to
be with factual fidelity, existing legal constructs, economic rationality, or
sensible sentencing policy, but rather with setting off on a new agenda of
corporate restructuring. "Abuse of position" in reference to private busi-
ness managers long has been an evocative term used in proposals for
more extensive public control of private enterprise.67 The idea here is
pure statism: any position of power or influence, no matter how
achieved, ultimately is answerable to the government, which is presumed
to be the ultimate repository and regulator of all forms of power-public
or private. Thus, we need not ask how the sole owner of a successful
business, built entirely through the imagination and effort of that individ-
ual, could breach a trust to the nonexistent beneficiaries or abuse a posi-
tion gained purely through private efforts, because, under the statist's
view of the world, no position exists except at the sufferance of the gov-
ernment and all positions are held in trust for the government.
This same sort of social re-engineering underlies the Commission's
idea about "pervasive tolerance"-whatever that concept is supposed to
mean-as leading to "the risk of criminal conduct beyond that reflected
in the instant offense," in other words, unknown or future crimes of some
unspecified type that have yet to be committed. Even when supported by
hard empirical data--as in proposals for "selective incapacitation" of vi-
olent recidivist individual offenders-this sort of idea is highly controver-
sial in terms of accepted concepts of legality in punishment.6" But in the
case of the Commission's Guidelines, the proposal is not to rehabilitate
or incapacitate, but rather is to punish a firm retrospectively as more
dence of crime. For a theoretical treatment consistent with that finding, see Jonathan R. Macey,
Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 315 (1991).
67. The Nader proposals for federal chartering (i.e bureaucratic control) are among the best
known of a long line of thinking in this vein. See supra note 47; see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975) (arguing that corporations are private governments that should be
restructured along the lines of the public government).
68. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FuTURE CRIMES (1985) (comparing "selec-
tive incapacitation" with "just desert" sentencing).
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culpable for future crimes that have never been committed and may
never be committed, which is completely over the edge of rationality.
The Obsession with Control. All of the Commission's other culpability
concepts, however, are but a prelude to the centerpiece of the Sentencing
Guidelines, which is to force the creation of a compliance bureaucracy
throughout corporate America. This is essentially why the big "stick" is
wielded in the first place; it permeates both the "culture" and size penal-
ties, and it is expressly formulated as the innocuous-sounding "effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law."69 A Commission-qual-
ified program in place prior to the offense will reduce the culpability
score by three points;70 however, an otherwise qualified program is con-
clusively disqualified if it fails to render "high-level personnel" in larger
firms or units (200 or more employees), and compliance program admin-
istrators in all firms, at least non-negligently non-suspicious, i.e., not
"willfully ignorant."71 Thus, for the potentially most culpable largest
firms (5000 or more employees), the combined net difference in culpabil-
ity score based on the compliance program and its consequences for man-
agerial ignorance of the offense is eight points (three for the program
itself plus five for resulting non-negligent ignorance) out of a total range
of ten, and therefore is the major difference between the big "stick" and
the smaller "stick" that the Commission calls a "carrot."
Furthermore, even if a firm takes a beating with the big "stick" be-
cause it does not have a Commission-qualified pre-offense compliance
program, it nonetheless, in addition to the fine, must be placed on proba-
tion if it is a medium to large firm (fifty or more employees) and "if, at
the time of sentencing," the firm does not have a Commission-qualified
"effective program to prevent and detect violations of law."72 The Com-
mission also throws in an unrestricted compliance requirement as an in-
dependent ground for a mandatory probation sentence, which is required
to be imposed "if such sentence is necessary to ensure that changes are
made within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal
69. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8AI.2 (comment. (n.3(i)-(iii))) (defining this concept).
70. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
71. Id. There is also a presumptive disqualification if a substantial authority person partici-
pated in the offense. Id. It remains unclear whether this undefined participation is the same as that
contemplated for high-level personnel, and how, if at all, it is related to the tolerance standard
elsewhere applied to substantial authority personnel.
72. Id. § 8DI.l(a)(3). This is only one of eight circumstances specified in which the court must
order probation.
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conduct."73 Apparently, this unrestricted provision would apply even if
the organization already had an "effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law." Furthermore, there is no limitation in the Guidelines
of what "changes... within the organization" may be ordered under
such a sentence. At least as far as the Commission is concerned, removal
of some or all of the management, or divestiture of ownership by some or
all of the pre-existing stockholders, would be permissible-indeed, ex-
pressly encouraged by the Guidelines-if the sentencing court believed
that such changes would reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct
of some unspecified nature. Presumably, for any firm that likelihood is
never zero, and therefore always could be reduced infinitesimally, which
appears to be all that is required under the Guidelines.74
Even aside from the alarming potential of the unrestricted authority
for corporate restructuring-which essentially gives a blank check for
the courts to run American business-the potential impact of these com-
pliance provisions is breathtaking. In effect, they mandate an entirely
new and alien approach to criminal law enforcement-and corporate
management-both for the relatively small number of firms caught in the
toils of the federal criminal system and the much larger number of firms
that never have and never will violate federal law, but are sufficiently
threatened by the big "stick" to implement the Commission's regime.
There should be no mistake about the fact that the Commission's Guide-
lines mandate a regime, not a standard of generally reasonable conduct
73. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(6). An even more general catch-all mandates probation "if necessary to
accomplish one or more of the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)." Id.
§ 8D 1. l(a)(8). The referenced statute includes such formulations as "to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense," and "to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." Id.
74. This is subject to the statutory constraints on probation conditions in 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b),
which carry over into the Guidelines, U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § SD1.3. The Commission has set up
an unusual dichotomy by mandating a probation sentence in a compulsory guideline, id. § 8D1.1,
but setting forth associated probation conditions in a permissive policy statement, id. § 8D1.4.
Thus, for example, although a court must sentence a corporation to probation if it lacks a qualified
compliance program, the Guidelines do not require a sentencing court to force a corporation to
create one as part of the probation conditions. Id. § 8D1.4(c). However, the Guidelines do recom-
mend such programs as part of probation. Id. This structure apparently is intended to deprive the
corporation of its appeal rights under the Sentencing Reform Act, which permits appeals only "if the
sentence... was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines" or if
the sentence "includes a more limiting condition of probation ... than the maximum established in
the guideline range." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2), (3) (1988) (emphasis added). As the "recommended"
probation conditions are mere "policy statements" as distinguished from "guidelines," presumably
the government will take the position that no appeal may be taken from their imposition.
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or "optimal care," as some may argue.7" Neither the Commission nor
anyone else has anything like the amount of information necessary to
prescribe an optimal care standard for internal corporate compliance ef-
forts, and the Commission does not purport to do so. Instead, the Com-
mission's Guidelines embody an obsession with public control of private
activity that is at war with the fundamental precepts of a free market
economy. It seeks to re-make private management structures into the
monolithic image of government bureaucracy, thus undermining the di-
versity of approach that lies at the heart of our freedoms and our well-
being, both economic and political.
Once again, elementary economics shows that the Commission's pro-
gram, even if interpreted in the most innocuous manner possible, is
wrong-headed and destructive. Given the limitless variety of firms
within our economy, it may be that some firms would benefit from the
type of formal, bureaucratic compliance effort that the Sentencing
Guidelines envision. But there is no reason to believe that all firms are
likely to benefit from that approach; there is every reason to believe that
different approaches will be optimal in different firms. Some firms are
inherently less bureaucratic, and might well achieve better compliance
rates through less bureaucratic mechanisms, such as financial rewards
and penalties, or separations of functions in particular ways. Further-
more, all of our experience tells us that, given the proper incentives, the
decisionmakers in the best position to determine the optimal form of
such efforts are the management or ownership of the firm in which they
have a personal stake, not seven Commissioners in Washington, sentenc-
ing judges, or probation officers.
In short, public-style bureaucracy is not the only way to solve a prob-
lem of law compliance, nor is it likely to be the best way for every private
firm in the United States, as currently mandated by the Commission's
Guidelines. Indeed, as a first approximation, common experience tells us
that public-style bureaucracy often is the worst way to solve any problem
of business management. Nor is it the predominant approach that has
been taken to law enforcement problems historically, especially criminal
law enforcement. To the contrary, the still-predominant method of crim-
inal law enforcement relies primarily on measured incentives-penalties
specified in advance, to be imposed when prohibited acts take place-and
75. Nolan Clark, the current Deputy Chief Counsel to the Commission, proposed this view.
Nolan E. Clark, Drafting the Guidelines: Rush to Judgment?, 14-15 (manuscript), in THE SEN-
TENCING GuIDELINms TAKE HOLD (Roger Pilon & John R. Lott, Jr., eds., forthcoming 1993).
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does not seek to specify the means by which the private actor avoids the
prohibited circumstances. The choice of means is left to the private ac-
tor, guided by the incentive supplied by the penalty. In that way, the
interests of public law enforcement are balanced against the autonomy of
the individual and the efficiency of the firm in carrying out its lawful
economic activities, which benefit all of society. To borrow the Commis-
sion's metaphor, this might be called the "stick or no stick" approach.
Its superiority from a policy perspective is obvious from the different in-
formational requirements for the formulation of sensible public policy:
policymakers need not worry about the nutritional value of "carrot," but
only about the size of the "stick."
However, the standard of evaluation here is not what is better policy,
but rather whether the Commission's rules pass the test of minimal ra-
tionality. In this case, they do not, both because the nutritional value of
the "carrot" is unknown and because the "stick" is sized arbitrarily.
Contrary to the Commission's apparent premise, the introduction of the
"carrot" does not make the size of the "stick" immaterial, because both
the size of the "stick" and the placement of the hoops will determine how
much "carrot" will be consumed. From this perspective, the best that
can be said of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines is that they are a mis-
guided attempt to import the theory of "optimal care" from the law-and-
economics literature on civil negligence standards.76 Although that the-
ory has its limitations even as a characterization of civil negligence law, it
cannot be superimposed on the strict corporate liability system of federal
criminal law, for several reasons.
First, whatever may be said of the correlation between the civil negli-
gence standard and an ideal of socially "optimal care," the Guidelines'
compliance regime does not approximate a civil negligence standard.
The Commission's definition of "effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law" makes liberal use of such terms as "reasonable" and
"due diligence." However, it ultimately prescribes a formal, bureau-
cratic model for internal compliance efforts including program adminis-
trators, personnel screening and disciplinary procedures, formalized
76. According to the basic concept of the law-and-economics literature, government can
achieve optimal-meaning socially cost-minimizing-law compliance either by a strict liability rule
that makes the actor liable for all external costs created by the activity, or by a negligence rule that
makes the actor liable only when he or she has not exercised optimal care. For an excellent sum-
mary of this law-and-economics literature, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS, ch. 6 & bibliographic app. (2d ed. 1989).
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monitoring and auditing systems, and the like. For the reasons discussed
above, that model has no possibility of coinciding even with the form,
much less the level, of socially optimal care in all or probably most situa-
tions. This deficiency is exacerbated by the procedural context in which
a sentencing court will evaluate such a program, after a crime has been
committed, at the instance of public prosecutors (not injured private par-
ties), and under the further threats of both the big "stick" and the inevi-
tability, under the probation guidelines, of either a mandated compliance
program to be implemented under judicial supervision, or, worse yet, the
unrestricted corporate restructuring authority.
Second, a critical component of any optimal care specification is the
level of resources devoted to compliance. Under the Commission's
Guidelines this is indeterminate, and is likely to be influenced by the size
of the big "stick." The optimal care mechanism of pure theory only
works under the assumptions that: (1) optimal care is specified to social
perfection; (2) it is literally costless for the private actor both to charac-
terize its own situation and to compare its care level to optimal care ex
ante; and (3) it is literally costless and perfectly error-free for the adjudi-
cator to determine ex post whether optimal care was exercised ex ante.77
It is only under all of these idealized assumptions that the size of the big
"stick" can even arguably be disregarded. 7  No real-world penalty sys-
tem, and certainly not our current federal criminal system, even ap-
proaches any of these ideal conditions.79 But if any one of them is not
satisfied-Le., until all the relevant information becomes perfect and
costless-then the size of the big "stick" matters very much; indeed it is
determinative of the efficacy of the system, which might actually increase
the level of crime, and in any case will decrease overall social welfare,
unless the big "stick" is sized optimally.
77. For a discussion of the possible consequences of deviations from these assumptions, see,
e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965 (1984); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncer-
tain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986); Mark F. Grady, Discontinuities and Infor-
mation Burdens: A Review of the Economic Structure of Tort Law by William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 658 (1988).
78. For the leading statement of the argument for the big "stick" of highly punitive sanctions,
see Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
79. This helps explain why the criminal law insists upon a subjective state of mind as a require-
ment of criminal liability, which in turn helps solve the private information problem of the actor's
self-characterization. See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics ofMens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing, 1993). This, however, does not completely solve the other information problems, particularly in
the area of adjudicative error. See supra note 77.
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Third, in the pure theory of optimal care penalties, the alternative to
the big "stick" is no stick at all-a zero penalty, indeed no liability at
all-whereas the Commission's structure calls for liability with a smaller
"stick," which changes the entire incentive structure by diluting the pay-
off to what would be otherwise optimal hoop-jumping. Introducing this
further complexity makes the information problem even worse, because
now the optimality of the overall system depends on perfect information
not only about optimal care, but also about both the big and smaller
"sticks" and their relationship to the true level of external harm created
by the offense.8 0
In sum, adding a "carrot" to the "stick" does not make the problem
any simpler, but immensely more complex, and essentially requires om-
niscience in the penalty structure. Short of costless omniscience, such a
penalty structure is more likely to be destructive than beneficial to soci-
ety, and may be worse than no penalty at all. Any penalty system that
cannot make even a plausible claim to superiority over no penalty at all is
not rational.
The Commission's failure here is not that it lacks omniscience, but
that it fails to understand the implications of that fact, or worse yet, does
not care. There is no indication within the Commission's materials that
it understands any of the foregoing points. Yet that is the less serious
problem, because there also is no indication that the Commission cares at
all about how much damage to the American economy could result from
its corporate penalty system, or even whether that system is likely to
decrease the actual incidence of crime within corporations. Certainly,
the Sentencing Guidelines do not reflect any coherent theory that could
make such a claim. The Commission's Guidelines reflect only an obses-
sion with government control over private enterprise.
B. Policy Without Reality
The lack of a coherent principled basis for the corporate Sentencing
Guidelines leaves the alternative of "experience"-basing sentencing
guidelines on empirical analysis of past sentencing practice, as the Com-
mission did with its initial sentencing guidelines for individuals. In this
80. For an examination of this point in the context of organizational sentencing, see Michael K.
Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REv. 395,
397-409 (1991), which completely explodes the theory of the Commission's compliance fixation.
Professor Block presented the paper at a conference held one year before the Sentencing Guidelines
became effective.
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respect, no extensive analysis or discussion is necessary, because the cor-
porate Sentencing Guidelines are not, and do not purport to be, based
upon prior sentencing practice. To the contrary, they admittedly are a
dramatic departure from past practice. Furthermore, although they
clearly are a radical departure-by order of magnitude, a ten to twenty-
fold increase in the general level of penalties-no one, but especially not
the Commission, has a very good idea about how radical a change is
being made to the level and structure of corporate penalties. These facts,
when coupled with the lack of a principled basis for the new structure,
raise legal questions, discussed in Part II below, regarding the Commis-
sion's authority to promulgate such a product. This section focuses on
what the Commission knew regarding past practice, and the explanations
the Commission gave for ignoring that experience.
In this respect, the Commission again presents an opaque explanation
suggesting that past practice data did not provide useful information:
[T]he Commission concluded that estimates of the average fines imposed
upon organizations are less meaningful than were the estimates of past
practice relating to the length of imprisonment terms served by individuals.
For many organizations, it appears that fines had been set based on inability
to or limited ability to pay a fine. Moreover, the amount of dollar loss in
organizational offenses has significantly increased in recent years, as has the
maximum fine amounts authorized by statute.8 '
This very carefully-drafted language needs to be carefully parsed for
what it does and does not say. Obviously, "less meaningful" is merely a
euphemism for "completely ignored." But now let us consider the sup-
posed justifications:
(1) The Commission's statement that it appears that fines had been
based on inability or limited by ability to pay means that the Commission
could not find a binding constraint statistically. But even if they had
found such a thing, why not look at a subset of cases that were not con-
strained? In fact, the Commission did so, presenting in the very same
document a set of cases selected on that precise basis.8 2 One does not
have to be a statistician to see that, once a constraining factor is removed
from the data or controlled in the analysis, the resulting findings are no
less valid than if there were no constraint at all. The Commission could
have developed unconstrained findings, like independent outside
81. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
82. Id. at app. C (entitled Profiles of Organizational Defendants that Appeared able to Pay the
Minimum of the Upper-Bound Guideline Fine Range).
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researchers.83
(2) "The amount of dollar loss has significantly increased" apparently
is intended to suggest that the older cases were useless. However, from
the beginning of the Commission's empirical work in 1987, the analysis
has included an investigation of the ratio of fines to loss, thereby auto-
matically controlling for loss. In the same report, the Commission
presents data controlled for loss, thereby demonstrating that it knows
how to do so.84 Once again, one does not need to be a mathematician to
see the transparent fallacy of the Commission's explanation, which essen-
tially says that whenever one variable takes different quantities, an equa-
tion cannot be solved. Mathematically, the exact opposite is true.
(3) By noting that "the maximum fine amounts authorized by statute"
have increased in recent years, the Commission apparently seeks to im-
ply, without actually asserting, another constraint in the older data. This
is made slightly more explicit in the Commission's specific excuse for
ignoring four years' worth of data on corporate sentencings in 1984-87,
which had been collected by considerable effort at taxpayers' expense.
The Commission excluded the data because "the fines in many of the
cases were limited by statutory maxima," and the data were "incom-
plete" in certain other respects.85 Here again, such a constraint-if it did
exist--could be reflected in adjustments to the analysis. But the facts in
this instance are known, because the 1984-87 data were compared to
later data precisely for the purpose of testing the hypothesis of a statu-
tory maximum fine constraint or even an influence, and the empirical
findings-both by internal Commission staff analysts86 and by independ-
ent outside research 7 -were that, when controlling for loss levels, there
was no general change in fine levels. Nonetheless, the 1984-87 data were
thrown away on the basis of a disproved constraint and because they
were "incomplete".-which no data set, including that ultimately used by
the Commission, ever is-and the staff members who conducted that
study subsequently left the Commission. Once again, one need not be an
expert in empirical analysis to see that neither a constraint-much less a
disproved one-nor incompleteness justifies discarding data. The only
83. See, e.g., supra note 6.
84. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, tbl. 21.
85. Id. at 17.
86. See 1990 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 469.
87. See Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Harm, supra note 6, at
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reason to completely discard data is to suppress the facts those data
show.
One wonders, however, why the Commission even bothered to present
these transparently fictitious explanations, because the Commission ac-
knowledges that it is not following past practice levels. Perhaps the ex-
planation lies in the Commission's assertion that it is only doubling or
tripling the general level of fines, 8 whereas independent outside re-
search-some of it using precisely the same data-estimates increases of
ten to twenty-fold, or larger.8 9 Given the impulses within the Commis-
sion that produced the ultimate guidelines, it is apparent that the Com-
mission neither knows nor cares what the ultimate impact will be.
Basically, past practice reflects penalty levels far below those contem-
plated by the new Guidelines. Furthermore, the structure of past prac-
tice contradicts virtually every major feature of the Commission's edifice.
Past practice fines were related primarily to loss, at a decreasing rate as
loss increased, and almost never related to either pecuniary gain or the
size of the organization. There was no focus on compliance programs,
and, aside from a few aberrational cases, no supervisory probation
sentences of the type that characterize the Commission's attempt to legis-
late a compliance bureaucracy for the American economy. 90 In terms of
the past corporate sentencing practices of the federal judiciary, the cor-
porate Sentencing Guidelines set off into completely uncharted territory.
II. RULES WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Can an administrative agency be authorized to issue rules without a
rational basis in either logic or experience? As a proposition of general
law in this country, the question answers itself with a resounding nega-
tive. But some readers may wonder whether the Sentencing Reform Act
even purports to authorize the breadth of social experimentation re-
flected in the Sentencing Guidelines. That answer again is a resounding
no: both in its detailed provisions and in the general framework estab-
lished for the Commission's activities, the Act not only fails to authorize,
88. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-24.
89. Using the Commission's own selected sample of cases unconstrained by ability to pay, John
Lott found a 20-fold increase in average penalties. John R. Lott, Jr., Will Consumers Be Haunted by
the United States Sentencing Commission's Corporate Guidelines?, in THE SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES TAKE HOLD, supra note 75.
90. See Mark A. Cohen et al., Organizations as Defendants in Federal Court: A Preliminary
Analysis of Prosecutions, Convictions, and Sanctions, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 103, 107-08 (1988); see
also supra note 6.
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but in many instances affirmatively disables, the Commission from acting
on the impulses reflected in the Guidelines. This Part presents a brief
discussion of the relevant provisions of the Act as applied to the key
structural features of the corporate Guidelines. In addition, it explores,
as a case study in the inadequacy of constraint by legislative intent alone,
one of the innovations of the Commission's new regime of corporate con-
trol by probation-the "shaming" sanction of court-ordered adverse
publicity-which was affirmatively denied to the Commission by the
Congress in the Act, but nonetheless appears in the corporate Sentencing
Guidelines.
While some of the statutory language might be criticized as less than
perfectly clear in imposing constraints on the Commission, the main
problem here is an inadequate enforcement mechanism. The principal
check on overreaching by the Commission is political rather than legal,
and the political process has proved inadequate to the task.
A. Taxation Without Representation
One reason why lawful Commission guidelines must be based in either
past practice, or a rigorous demonstration of compelling policy grounds
for deviation from past practice, is that the Commission is institutionally
incompetent to function as an inferior legislature-what Justice Scalia,
dissenting in Mistretta, called a "junior-varsity Congress."9 1 The major-
ity in Mistretta did not rule that a "junior-varsity Congress" was consti-
tutional, or even lawful under the Sentencing Reform Act, but rather
differed from Justice Scalia on whether the Commission was intended to
operate in that manner.9" At the time of its definitive construction of the
Act in Mistretta, the Court had before it only the initial guidelines for
individuals, which were firmly based in past sentencing practice, with
only minor deviations. Unlike the initial guidelines, the corporate Sen-
tencing Guidelines are premised expressly on a radical and systematic
departure from the penalty levels of past practice. This feature of the
new corporate Guidelines exceeds the Commission's legal authority
under the Act, because it essentially constitutes "taxation without repre-
sentation"-a general increase in penalty levels that cannot be justified as
a rationalization measure, promulgation by a politically unrepresentative
91. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. See supra notes 2, 11, 12 and accompanying text.
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body.9 3
There is nothing in the Act to suggest that the Commission is author-
ized to mandate an overall increase in penalty levels, particularly where,
as in the case of the corporate Guidelines, neither reason nor experience
demonstrates that past levels were in any way inadequate. To the con-
trary, in such circumstances, both the Act and general principles of sepa-
ration of powers indicate that the Commission's overall increase of
penalty levels is unauthorized; it involves the Commission in arrogating
to itself the power to impose a new tax on the American economy.94
Whatever else the Commission may be authorized to do, it is not author-
ized simply to tax, which is quintessentially a legislative function.
From this perspective, it is important to distinguish between a redistri-
bution of penalties and a general, systematic, across-the-board increase in
penalty levels. Whereas a redistribution arguably might be justified as
part of the Commission's rationalization role, an across-the-board in-
crease cannot be justified on any legal ground, and violates both the Act
and the basic constitutional limitation on the Commission's institutional
competence.
The Sentencing Reform Act does not contain the slightest indication
that Congress intended to delegate its legislative authority to set overall
penalty levels to the Commission. The provisions of the Act suggest the
contrary, because they require the Commission to use average levels of
past practice penalties as a starting point in the development of the
Guidelines, and authorize deviations from past practice only on a rigor-
ous showing of necessity to meet the statutorily-declared purposes of sen-
tencing.95 However those purposes are construed, the requisite showing
of necessity cannot be made merely by the Commission's recitation of the
statutory words in its background commentary, for that view would re-
duce the statutory constraint to an empty platitude. But if any more
rigorous test is applied, then the corporate Guidelines fail, because no
aspect of these Guidelines' deviation from past practice even meets the
standard of rationality, much less demonstrated necessity.
The Act's statutory constraint is reinforced by the constitutional limits
on the Commission's powers, as recognized by the Supreme Court in
93. See generally Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal
Liability, Part II, in THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES TAKE HOLD, supra note 75.
94. When penalties exceed the socially optimal level, they function similarly to an excise tax.
See Block, supra note 80, at 398-402.
95. See supra 12, 14 notes and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:397
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/8
1993] CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 429
Mistretta, which confirmed that the Commission lacks "political author-
ity" and that its proper role is to "rationalize" the sentencing process. It
seems doubtful that any across-the-board increase in penalty levels ever
could be defended as a rationalization measure. Certainly the corporate
Guidelines do not qualify as such, because they are not based on any
coherent rationale for the systematic increase in penalty levels.
B. Regulation Without Legislation
The second major feature of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines is the
compliance bureaucracy that is imposed upon American business
through the culpability score and the expansive provisions for corporate
probation, under the supervision of the courts as a shadow regulatory
bureaucracy.96 The legal problem with the shadow bureaucracy is that it
was never authorized by any act of Congress. Moreover, the Commis-
sion's enabling statute, the Sentencing Reform Act, clearly reflects a con-
gressional intent to deny the Commission any power to set up a new
bureaucracy for supervising American business. That legislative intent is
flouted by the Guidelines.
The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act reflects careful
congressional attention to the potential problem of over-expansive judi-
cial supervision of organizations through the criminal process and espe-
cially the probation sentence, and an intent to confine such activities to
what is demonstrably necessary either to carry out another sentence or to
prevent "the continuation or repetition of illegal activities."97 In general,
the legislative history rejects the idea "that courts manage organizations
as part of probation supervision."98
The Commission's elaborate compliance bureaucracy provisions are
totally at odds with the congressional intent. Even under the most
favorable interpretation of its motivation, the compliance bureaucracy is
not predicated on an assertion-much less the requisite showing-that
these provisions are necessary to prevent a "continuation or repetition"
of the illegal activities. Rather, at best they are a standard of reasonable
care. They are in no way limited to the type of offense for which the
organization is prosecuted. They are, instead of limited restrictions nar-
rowly tailored to a specific problem, a broad form of social re-engineer-
96. See Parker, supra note 93, at 42 (manuscript).
97. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 13, at 96-97.
98. Id. at 99.
Washington University Open Scholarship
430 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ing, only masquerading under the rubric of crime prevention. Thus,
merely in basic concept-quite aside from all of the difficulties of imple-
mentation and administration-the Commission's structure violates the
Act.
Furthermore, as the Commission never was intended to be a regula-
tory agency with respect to private activity, its enabling statute contains
none of the usual controls that are designed to keep regulatory powers
within their proper bounds-such as a clear statement of regulatory
objectives and jurisdiction, rigorous process control on policymaking ac-
tivity, and direct judicial review of administrative initiatives. As a result,
when the Commission assumes a private regulatory role, it is beyond
control by the ordinary standards of administrative law.99 When any
agency of government is placed outside control by either political or legal
means, the inevitable and predictable result is overreaching of the type
represented by the corporate Guidelines.
C. Punishment Contrary to Law: The "Punitive Publicity" Sanction
As a further example of overreaching by the corporate Sentencing
Guidelines that is unambiguous, consider the Guidelines' endorsement of
a "punitive publicity" sanction to be imposed as a condition of probation:
The court may order the organization, at its expense and in the format and
media specified by the court, to publicize the nature of the offense commit-
ted, the fact of conviction, the nature of the punishment imposed, and the
steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar offenses. 1°°
Apparently, the Commission thinks that this will be a politically popular
way of "shaming" corporations and adding a further threat of harm to a
firm's reputation, over and above the conviction itself.101 However, and
quite aside from its vagueness, the Commission's endorsement of this
proposal is illegal because the Sentencing Reform Act clearly rejected the
99. For an interesting analysis of the administrative law implications of the Commission's
unique role and statutory authority, see Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Admin-
istrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1991) (arguing
that courts should judicially review the Commission's actions through the courts' power under the
Sentencing Reform Act to depart from the Guidelines). Wright's view, however, does not seem to
contemplate an outcome similar to one envisioned by the corporate Sentencing Guidelines.
100. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.4(a).
101. Especially for corporations, but to some extent for any convicted criminal, formal criminal
penalties are only the beginning of the consequences of conviction. Further consequences include
subsequent civil actions brought by private or government plaintiffs, potential loss of licenses, and
important reputational or stigma effects. Empirical research shows that for organizations, the
reputational effect overshadows all formal penalties, both civil and criminal. See JONATHAN
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entire notion of a punitive publicity sanction. In response to proposals
for just such a sanction, the Act substituted the sanction of notice to
victims of certain types of offenses,' °2 which was purely compensatory in
nature and strictly limited in terms of the burden that may be imposed
upon a defendant.
The Commission's error here appears to be based on some faulty his-
tory. According to an explanation given by the Commission's Chairman,
the idea of punitive publicity "was endorsed two decades ago by the
United States National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws."'10 3 But in fact, the majority of that commission-popularly
known as the Brown Commission-expressly rejected the idea of a puni-
tive publicity sanction, which was a minority view."°
More importantly, this same idea of punitive publicity actually was
presented to Congress, and rejected by Congress, in the Sentencing Re-
form Act itself. In the course of the federal recodification efforts of the
1970s, a less expansive version of a publicity sanction-now called an
"order of notice to victims"-was proposed; 0 5 even that was rejected by
Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act. The legislative history of the
Act reflects the rationale that public notice should be limited strictly to
KARPOFF & JOHN R. LOTr, JR., THE REPUTATIONAL PENALTY FIRMS BEAR FOR COMMITrING
FRAUD (UCLA, Anderson Graduate School of Management, Working Paper No. 90-11, 1990).
The Guidelines' "shaming" provisions thus may also displace another market in reputation. The
existence of the reputational effect shows that a market operates in the distribution of information
regarding firms' activities. Presumably that market-which includes not only the general media but
also trade and financial media-is competitive. Where is the market failure that justifies the Com-
mission's intervention? Perhaps more accurately, what assures that the government-mandated infor-
mation is accurate?
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3555.
103. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 120.
104. A computer search of the formulation used by the Chairman's article suggests that the
source of the Commission's apocryphal history may be a misreading of a 1983 article by the Austra-
lian law professor Brent Fisse. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deter-
rence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1229 (1983). However, Fisse was
referring to a 1970 Study Draft published for comment by the Brown Commission. The Brown
Commission's final report, issued the following year, rejected the idea of punitive publicity "as inap-
propriate with respect either to organizations or to individuals, despite its possible deterrent effect,
since it came to close to the adoption of a policy approving social ridicule as a sanction," and instead
proposed a narrower concept of notice to victims. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF THE FED-
ERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT § 3007 & cmt. (1971). Fisse's article acknowledged these
later developments. See Fisse, supra, at 1230 n.424.
Moreover, Fisse wrote his article prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, in
which Congress rejected even the Brown Commission's proposal as overly broad and unduly
punitive.
105. Proposed Criminal Code of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2005 (1978).
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the compensatory purpose of facilitating civil relief and other corrective
actions by actually notifying victims:
The Committee does not intend that the section be used to order "correc-
tive advertising" or to subject a defendant to public derision. Publication
should not be required beyond that which is necessary to notify the victims
of the defendant's conviction.10 6
The resulting statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3555-the direct lineal de-
scendent of the Brown Commission proposal-is limited to "an offense
involving fraud or other intentionally deceptive practices," requires spe-
cial presentence procedures and considerations, and limits the permissi-
ble cost of notice to $20,000.107
The Commission's endorsement of this obviously problematical propo-
sal 10 8 cannot be based on mere ignorance, as both the facts and this anal-
ysis were supplied to them years ago.'0 9 Nor do any of the Commission's
current materials suggest any basis for reconciling this provision with the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that defines the Commission's powers, as
opposed to "the English Bread Acts of the early 19th century" ' 0 or a
twenty-year old proposal ultimately rejected by the Brown Commission
and Congress. There is no principle of statutory interpretation or judi-
cial review of agency action that is sufficient to permit the Commission to
follow "early 19th century" English acts and ignore the intent of the
United States Congress as expressed in 1984, under a currently operative
statute defining the Commission's powers.
D. Defective Process
The foregoing sections of this Part have shown that the Commission
has violated the provisions of its enabling statute, and exceeded the
106. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 13, at 85; see also id. at 83-84.
107. Although the Guidelines purport to authorize the publicity sanction as a condition of pro-
bation rather than under § 3555, it is highly unlikely that Congress, having carefully crafted these
limitations on the explicit sanction of public notice, nonetheless intended to permit the Commission
and the courts to evade those limitations recasting the sanction as a condition of probation. The
statutory authority for probation conditions includes an order of notice to victims, but only "pursu-
ant to the provisions of section 3555," as one of the listed conditions permitted, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(b)(4).
108. The analysis here does not reach this proposal's constitutional aspect or the likely problems
in its administration, but instead focuses only on the threshold question of congressional intent,
which clearly runs counter to this idea.
109. See Parker, supra note 2, at 545-46. See United States Sentencing Commission, 1988 Dis-
cussion Materials, 10 WHITTIER L. REv. 14 (1988) (noting these points).
110. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 120.
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bounds of its constitutionally permitted authority as conceived by both
the majority and dissenting opinions in Mistretta, by promulgating the
Guidelines. However, Congress took no action to disapprove or modify
the Guidelines under the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act,11
and the judicial review provisions of the Act seem calculated to discour-
age any effective review of the Guidelines' rationality.112 Thus, while the
adverse publicity sanction may be subject to at least some scrutiny by the
courts when applied in particular case, the main structural features of the
Guidelines are unlikely to be reviewed.
Given the weakness of these enforcement mechanisms, it should come
as no surprise that we observe the Commission now engaged in social
experimentation, for no effective discipline has been applied. The Com-
missioners themselves do not have to be re-elected, they cannot be re-
moved by the President except for cause, and, unlike all federal judges
except those on the Supreme Court, they do not have to answer to a
higher court. Thus, while the substance of the Sentencing Reform Act
purports to impose a discipline, the Commission already has learned that
it may exceed the substantive constraints with impunity. Every reason
exists to believe that it will continue to do so.
III. RULES WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALITY: THE CASE OF THE
"CRIMINAL PURPOSE ORGANIZATION"
With so many problems in terms of basic rationality, and disobedience
to the statutory mandate, it is not surprising that the corporate Sentenc-
ing Guidelines raise a number of constitutional problems as well, which
to some extent are anticipated in the foregoing discussion. The basic fea-
tures of the Guidelines obviously raise problems under some of the most
fundamental constitutional doctrines--due process,1 13 separation of pow-
111. 28 U.S.C. § 9 9 4(p).
112. Although the Guidelines are subject to the notice-and-comment rulemaking standards of
the Administrative Procedure Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(x), Congress withheld the authority for judi-
cial review under general standards of administrative law. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 13, at
181 ("It is ... not intended that the guidelines be subject to appellate review under chapter 7 of title
5."). As a result, courts can review the Guidelines only in particular criminal cases and only when
narrowly specified grounds for appeal are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Some argue that courts should
have even narrower judicial review channeled through the courts' power to depart from guidelines
sentences in atypical cases, see Wright, supra note 99, at 58-66. Under this view, the core of the
Guidelines would be virtually immune from judicial review.
113. In addition to their vagueness and overbreadth, the Sentencing Guidelines probably violate
substantive due process. Given the lack of coherence in the Commission's approach as shown in
Section I of this Article, it may not matter whether a reviewing court applies the legislative-style
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ers, 114 and equal protection' 1 -that are deserving of full consideration.
But in the interest of confining this Article to a reasonable length, this
Part will focus instead on a second case study of yet another radical fea-
ture of the Sentencing Guidelines: the Commission's legislation of a
"death penalty" for what it calls a "criminal purpose organization." In
this arena, the Commission's Guidelines present a virtual encyclopedia of
methods of governmental overreaching.
The "criminal purpose organization" provision of the Guidelines is the
ultimate embodiment of the Commission's statist approach: a determi-
nation, based entirely on matters other than the offense of conviction,
whether a particular person is "good" enough to be allowed to live or
"bad" enough to be given the death penalty for an offense that otherwise,
by definition, does not warrant such a penalty. It should not provide us
with much solace that, at least in this initial application, the person is an
"artificial" one.
The Commission's corporate death penalty directs the courts that:
If, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the organization, the court determines
that the organization operated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily
by criminal means, the fine shall be set at an amount ... sufficient to divest
rational basis test adopted in cases like Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), or a more
stringent rationality test supplied by administrative law. See Wright, supra note 99, at 55-69. Given
the Commission's statutory exemption from the judicial review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, how will anyone obtain review of the basic structure of the Guidelines? See id.
114. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
115. Although the Sentencing Guidelines formally apply to all organizations, see supra note 3,
the Commission's preferred target is business firms and their potential for pecuniary gain. The
Guidelines provide for downward departures both for public entities, U.S.S.G., supra note 4,
§ 8C4.7, and for firms that do not have shareholders, particularly if they fall into the preferred
category exemplified by "a labor union convicted of embezzlement of pension funds":
If the members or beneficiaries, other than shareholders, of the organization are direct
victims of the offense, a downward departure may be warranted. If the members or benefi-
ciaries of the organization are direct victims of the offense, imposing a fine upon the organi-
zation may increase the burden upon the victims of the offense without achieving a
deterrent effect. In such cases, a fine may not be appropriate. For example, departure may
be appropriate if a labor union is convicted of embezzlement of pension funds.
Id. § 8C4.8; see 1990 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 176-77 (testimony of Commission Chairman).
Here again, under any level of scrutiny, it is difficult to see any basis for preferring members or
beneficiaries over shareholders. Many instances of corporate criminal liability can and do have the
effect of doubly victimizing shareholders in the manner described. Is there something inherently bad
about shareholding and good about being a debt creditor of the same entity? Both may invest to
secure their retirement. Or, what about mutual insurance companies? Are the policyowner-stock-
holders the preferred beneficiaries or the disliked shareholders?
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the organization of all its net assets.' 16
Here again, we have a proposal that is likely to be politically popular-at
least until one realizes what "criminal purpose organization" actually
means under the Guidelines. But it is inconsistent with the Sentencing
Reform Act and unconstitutional.
As with the punitive publicity idea, there is no statutory authority for
this provision, and considerable evidence of legislative intent to the con-
trary. The most closely analogous situation Congress considered was the
imposition of business restrictions on convicted organizations as condi-
tions of probation. In that context, Congress was so concerned about
overly broad applications that it deleted the provision authorizing "de-
barment" of an organization from a particular line of business as a stan-
dard condition of probation, on the rationale that it "might encourage
inappropriate use to put a legitimate enterprise out of business."117 Con-
gress further provided some indication of what would be considered to be
an "illegitimate" business, as one that "consistently operates outside the
law" and "in a totally illegal manner... [as] where a business exists only
as a front for those individuals who use it for their own fraudulent pur-
poses.""' 8 While even these formulations may suffer from some vague-
ness and overbreadth, they are far narrower than what the Commission
apparently has in mind.
Compared with the rare case in which the Congress thought that a
debarment from a line of business may be appropriate,119 the Commis-
sion's background report indicates the application of its death penalty
fine could be anywhere from five percent to fully one-third of all con-
victed corporations.' 20 At neither end of that spectrum does the Com-
mission-defined case for destroying firms seem rare at all; at the upper
116. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C1.1.
117. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 13, at 97; see also id. at 68-69.
118. Id. at 69.
119. Congress believed that it would be a rare case, S. REP. No. 225, supra note 13, at 69, where
the measure under its consideration would be appropriate, and that measure was not the death
penalty fine ultimately adopted by the Commission, but instead a probation condition that would bar
the firm from a particular line of business for the duration of the probation sentence.
120. The Commission classified 15 out of 328 firms sentenced in 1988 as criminal purpose orga-
nizations, with another four as missing data/unknown, for an approximate rate of 5%. SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT, supra note 4, tbl. 7. For the years 1989 and 1990, the rate of offenders
definitively classified as criminal purpose organizations fell, but the number of missing
data/unknown rose dramatically. If one adds the unknowns-which could well be undecided in the
staff's simulations-then the rates for 1989 and 1990 would change to about 33% and 23%,
respectively.
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end, it would mean that the Commission was going into the business of
destroying some 100 firms per year through the federal sentencing
system.
The Commission's definition of criminal purpose organization is one
"operated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal
means"-not "totally," "exclusively," "consistently," or even "princi-
pally," but only "primarily." What does this mean? Supreme Court au-
thority indicates that "primarily" does not require very much. 121 For
example, if a highly diversified firm has one substantial department
whose business is supposedly infected by criminal practices, then the en-
tire organization could be declared criminal and required to forfeit its
right to exist, even if the vast majority of its operations were perfectly
legitimate. The Commission may or may not intend this result, but one
cannot determine from the language employed. 122 However, it is clear
that a Congress unwilling to authorize even the lesser sanction of debar-
ment from a particular line of business for anything short of a "totally
illegal" operation is highly unlikely to have intended to permit an organi-
zational death penalty under less aggravated circumstances.
Furthermore, the Commission's criminal organization proposal does
not appear to require that the criminality be related to the instant offense
of conviction, nor indeed to any adjudicated violation of law at all.
Rather, it seems to permit, or perhaps even to require, that the courts
make such a determination on the basis of undefined "history and char-
acteristics of the defendant." Therefore, the Commission has declared
open season for any sort of prosecutorial allegations of misconduct-past
or future-without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even
by competent evidence.
Thus, the Commission's criminal organization proposal violates virtu-
ally every one of the legal and constitutional rules that make up the doc-
121. In Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947), the Supreme Court construed the
term "primarily," as used in the management-interlock provisions of § 32 of the Banking Act of
1933, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988), to mean only substantial, 329 U.S. at 446. The Court applied that
definition to hold that a firm whose revenues from underwritings ranged from 26% to 39% of its
total revenues was primarily engaged in the underwriting of securities, notwithstanding that its bro-
kerage business at all times had a larger share of its revenues. Id. at 446-47.
122. If the Commission intended a narrower application, it had other verbal formulations avail-
able. Agnew distinguishes "principally" as a higher threshold. See 329 U.S. at 447-48. Corporate
law often uses an "all or substantially all" formulation in regulating corporate transactions. But it is
unnecessary to look outside the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act, which uses "to-
tally" or at least a "generally" formulation. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 13, at 69.
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trine of "legality" in criminal law: 12 3 it lacks authority in the enabling
statute; it offends due process by failing to specify the proscribed conduct
in advance,1 24 by its oppressive vagueness, 125 and by failing to require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt 126 by competent evidence in a trial by
jury; 1 27 it makes up a new offense ex post, 128 without guiding standards;
and it declares someone a "criminal," unworthy of existence, without
trial and on the basis of status ("history and characteristics") rather than
specified conduct. 129 It is nothing more than a vaguely-worded, ex post
facto law that purports to authorize a judicial bill of attainder, 131 consist-
ing of a death penalty that is, by definition, disproportionate to the un-
123. For a general discussion of the doctrine of "legality," see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality,
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985) (arguing that the core
principle is a standard of regularity in governmental actions).
124. A criminal prohibition "in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessar-
ily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application... violates the first essential of due process of
law." Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
125. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (local vagrancy ordinance
void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
... and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions").
126. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt constitutionally re-
quired as a matter of due process).
127. The Sixth Amendment guarantees trial by jury "[in all criminal prosecutions." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI.
128. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
129. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (punishment on status alone violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment).
130. The core prohibition of the bill of attainder clause is punishment without trial, whether
based on conduct or status. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-18 (1946). The Supreme
Court's earliest applications struck down post-Civil War loyalty oaths imposed for admission to
practice law in federal courts and for state licensing of various professionals. See, e.g., Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866). After some backsliding,
see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), this application was extended
to a new era of crime by association, see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). More re-
cently, the Supreme Court has focused on whether certain disablements outside the context of crimi-,
nal penalties constitute bills of attainder. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425 (1977) (retention of presidential papers); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Re-
search Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (ineligibility for federal financial assistance).
No such ambiguities attend the application of the bill of attainder prohibition to the Commission's
criminal purpose organization penalty, which clearly is intended to be punishment, and is imposed in
a criminal case. Furthermore, it is levied on the basis of matters that, if conduct at all, have not been
proved at a trial. The basis for calling an offender a criminal purpose organization is by definition
conduct (or history and characteristics) other than the offense of conviction proven at trial. The
Commission's provision is a bill of attainder. The more interesting legal questions are whether the
Bill of Attainder Clause can be invoked by corporations, since the Supreme Court held it unavailable
to states in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and whether courts will hold it
inapplicable to the Commission, on the ground that the Commission is not the same as Congress,
and therefore nothing it promulgates could be deemed legislation.
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derlying offense.131
For what supposedly compelling policy objective has the Commission
acted? Essentially nothing. True criminal "front" organizations tend to
be gossamer things that usually disappear prior to sentencing. They can
be far more effectively controlled by the individual sentencing of the
principals. If the principals are not effectively restrained, they simply
will create a new "front." Thus, the practical effect of the Commission's
guideline on front organizations is likely to be zero. Only the legitimate
firm has something to fear from this provision.
IV. WRONG WITHOUT REMEDY?
The foregoing discussions of this Article have identified a number of
very serious problems with the rationality, legality, and constitutionality
of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines, without even purporting to pres-
ent an exhaustive analysis. Enough has been said, however, to identify
the underlying problem with the Commission that now has resulted in a
set of proposals that are, to say the least, disturbing. They are disturbing
not because corporations are "good" rather than "bad." Ultimately cor-
porations are neither: they are mere instrumentalities, only means to an
end. However, the same is true about sentencing guidelines and sentenc-
ing commissions.
Corporate sentencing is important, if at all, only because corporations
are an important means to an important end, which is the freedom and
autonomy of individuals to pursue their lawful objectives, both economic
and otherwise, through voluntary, private association. The Sentencing
Guidelines, to the extent that they interfere unnecessarily with the effi-
cacy of the corporation as a private associational mechanism, are a threat
to the freedom-and not only the material well-being-of individuals in
our society. Many if not most readers of this Article will disagree with
the strongest form of the argument here that the Commission's corporate
Guidelines reflect a philosophy of statism, in seeking to interfere with
131. This provision is one of the few punitive actions that courts could actually hold unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate based on the current state of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), the Court backed away from the
consensus test of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), essentially on the ground that authoritative
standards of proportionality do not exist. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686. But the Guideline's crimi-
nal purpose organization provision provides a rare exception: in this instance, the Commission al-
ready has established, in the remainder of the Guidelines, the proportionate punishment for the
offense in question. Thus, by definition, the additional criminal purpose organization punishment is
disproportionate, to the extent that the factors considered are improper.
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corporate operations precisely because they are one of the last bastions,
and symbols, of private autonomy left after a generation of dramatic ex-
pansion in governmental power through a myriad of other means. But
the fair-minded among them might concede that the Commission's prod-
uct certainly weighs in on the interventionist side of the balance.
The more fundamental question is how the Commission reached the
point of promulgating its interventionist product under a statute that
simply cannot be read as a mandate to restructure the American econ-
omy, or, for that matter, to support any sort of interventionism by the
Commission into corporate management. The case studies given
above-especially the adverse publicity example-indicate that the Com-
mission believes it can get away with anything, including a direct contra-
diction of a clearly expressed congressional intent. In this author's
judgment, the Commission probably is correct in that belief. The corpo-
rate Guidelines laid before the Congress for six months before they be-
came effective; nothing was done to postpone or modify them. This
might be explained as an artifact of current politics, or the general inertia
of Congress, but that seems doubtful. The Commission has been able to
obtain virtually any statutory amendment it has desired.132 Thus, for
example, if the adverse publicity provision becomes an embarrassment,
the Commission probably will be able to have the statute changed before
it will have to withdraw the guideline.
Without effective political discipline, the legal constraints on the Com-
mission's powers also are unlikely to prove effective. In terms of sub-
stance, the Commission was placed under the fairly severe statutory
discipline of choosing between empirically-based guidelines following
past practice and providing a rigorous demonstration of the inadequacy
of past practice. In the corporate Sentencing Guidelines, the Commis-
sion chose neither. Congress bypassed its chance to disapprove; thus it
seems unlikely that the courts will do anything about it. Even if they
wished to do so, they are discouraged by the limitation on judicial review
imposed by the Sentencing Reform Act, which focuses judicial review on
microscopic issues arising in particular sentencings and therefore away
from examining the rationality of the basic structure. Successful litiga-
tion challenges are likely to be those nibbling around the edges of the
132. The key provision specifying the Commission's powers under the Sentencing Reform Act
has been amended six times in the nine years since its enactment. See 28 U.S.C. § 994. In most
cases this was done at the instance of the Commission and in the substance desired by the
Commission.
Washington University Open Scholarship
440 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Guidelines. A fairly target-rich environment for defense lawyers is still
left, but it also leaves a fundamentally interventionist core in place.
From this perspective, Justice Scalia was more perceptive than the ma-
jority in Mistretta when he condemned the Commission as a "junior-
varsity Congress" designed to make the "senior-varsity" less politically
responsive:
By reason of today's decision, I anticipate that Congress will find delegation
of its lawmaking powers much more attractive in the future. If rulemaking
can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or executive powers, I
foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the political process,
to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsi-
bility.... This is an undemocratic precedent that we set .... 133
Justice Scalia was concerned primarily with the temptation for Congress
to delegate "thorny, 'no-win' political issues" to the unresponsive body,
thus insulating the members of Congress from the ire of their constitu-
ents in the "no-win" situation. But that concern may not go far enough
to explain the problem of the Sentencing Commission, at least as it has
played out in the Sentencing Guidelines for organizations. Members of
Congress also are members of government, and, as such, share an interest
with members of the Commission in aggrandizing public power at the
expense of private autonomy. It may not be simply that Congress wishes
to avoid the troubling features of the Guidelines; Congress itself may
have an affirmative interest in facilitating the Commission's agenda,
under the political cover of the "expert" agency.
If that is so, then why does no one else seem to care enough to impose
political costs on the Congress for creating this structure? The corporate
and business community is relatively well-positioned to influence Con-
gress, and yet there is little indication that it sought to do so when the
Guidelines were pending. There are three possible interpretations here-
one more optimistic than the others, but all somewhat troubling.
The most optimistic interpretation is the "cynical" scenario set forth at
the beginning of this Article: that, in fact, the corporate Sentencing
Guidelines will have only a limited adverse effect on the economy in gen-
eral, and are merely political theater. Under this interpretation, the busi-
ness community could believe that providing the politicians with their
theater is an acceptable price to pay for protection from an even more
aggressive form of government intervention in business.
133. 488 U.S. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The more pessimistic interpretations are that some segments of the
business community actually may have incentives to join with the gov-
ernment. One such interest group is corporate management; another is
the more bureaucratically managed firms.
The alternative to corporate entity liability and punishment is individ-
ual punishment. Individuals within firms generally will not bear the full
cost of the Commission's compliance regime; it will be passed on to
shareholders and consumers. Yet they do bear the costs of individual
penalties, so that expanding the notion of corporate culpability and bu-
reaucratic controls could have some payoff to them. From this point of
view, the relative quiescence of the business community vis-a-vis the
Guidelines might indicate only another example of the "agency cost"
problem of divergence between the interests of the firm and its agents.
Finally, there would be some incentive for more bureaucratic firms to
support the Commission's structure as a means of gaining a competitive
advantage over less bureaucratic rivals. As noted above, the mandated
compliance regime is likely to have a more severe impact on the less
bureaucratic firms.
All of these interpretations, however, are troubling from the perspec-
tive of the long-term relationship between the individual and the state.
Whether the firms are simply making a small "protection" payment, the
managements implicitly are "plea bargaining" with their firms' re-
sources, or some firms are seeking advantage over their rivals; in any
case, they are only temporizing with the underlying problem of un-
checked governmental power. The "protection" analogy is most useful
here: making the payoff provides only a temporary respite; the longer-
term result usually is a demand for an even higher payment.
In the particular case of the Commission's corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, the potential could be controlled simply by taking the subject
away from the Commission. In retrospect, corporate sentencing proba-
bly never should have been assigned to the Commission, simply because
corporate sentencings do not occur with sufficient frequency in the fed-
eral courts to justify the sort of empirically-based guideline system that
the Sentencing Reform Act envisioned. The cleanest solution would be
to abolish corporate criminal liability altogether, as that concept is at
best a useless legal anomaly, and often much worse than useless, as is
illustrated by the Guidelines."' Short of that measure, the only legisla-
134. See Parker, supra note 93 (proposing this argument).
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tive action that is likely to be both feasible and efficacious is simply to
withdraw corporate sentencing from the Commission's jurisdiction en-
tirely. No less rigorous structural constraint seems capable of restraining
the Commission's impulses. No non-legislative action is likely to be ef-
fective at all. Given the existing institutional arrangements, there is no
possibility of relief inside the Commission, and very little in the courts.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/8
